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1971 REVISION OF EVICTION
PRACTICE IN WISCONSIN
ROBERT F. BODEN*
INTRODUCTION
For the most of the decade of the 1960's, the State Bar of Wisconsin
was engaged in a monumental research and law revision project to
update the real property statutes of Wisconsin. Part of this project
involved the revision of practice and procedure in the eviction of ten-
ants from real property. The work on this phase of the project was
undertaken by the Landlord-Tenant Study Committee of the State Bar
beginning in the summer of 1964. The author of this article was the
Research Reporter to the Study Committee. A draft of a new eviction
procedure was approved by the Study Committee after many meetings
and many amendments in 1967. This portion of the total revision of
real property law was then integrated into the entire project which, in
due course, was presented by the State Bar to the 1969 Legislature.
That portion of the project concerned with landlord and tenants which
included the revision of eviction procedure was passed by the Wiscon-
sin Legislature as Chapter 284 of the Laws of 1969, to be effective July
1, 1971. The new eviction procedure constituted a rather substantial de-
parture from the old unlawful detainer procedure which had previously
obtained in Wisconsin and which was largely unchanged since adopted
in 1849.
BASIC PLAN FOR REWRITING EVICTION PROCEDURE
Three possible alternatives presented themselves as available in a
rewriting of eviction procedure. They were:
1. A revision of Chapter 291 on unlawful detainer to accommodate
it to modern day practice, particularly in its application to courts of rec-
ord, the basic law having been written for justice court practice in 1849.1
2. An incorporation of eviction procedure into Chapter 299 of the
Statutes, the Small Claims Act resulting from court reorganization
effective January 1, 1962.2
3. The writing of an entirely new procedure as part of the Statutes
on landlord and tenant unrelated to any other procedure and specifically
covering eviction cases.
The second alternative was chosen for many reasons, not all of them
related to the law of landlord and tenant. These are:
* Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University; member of the Wisconsin
Bar; Research Reporter for the State Bar Revision of Eviction Procedure,
1964-68.
1Wis. REv. STATS. 1849, c. 117, sec. 1, et seq.
2 Wis. LAWS 1961, ch. 519.
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1. Chapter 291 in its present form is geared to justice court prac-
tice. There does not seem to be any reason for attempting simply to
patch it up. The law presently governing unlawful detainer, discussed
below, is just such an attempt and has produced more confusion than
anything else. Secondly, our Chapter 291 traces itself back to an essen-
tially criminal statute in England, and the feeling of the Study Commit-
tee was that a clear break should be made now definitely establishing
the action for eviction as a civil action. Any revision of Chapter 291
would probably not accomplish this purpose.
2. Chapter 299 is an attempt to provide as summary a proceeding as
is reasonable in small claims cases in county courts. It is adaptable to
any proceeding where the issues to be litigated are not usually complex
and where a more summary type proceeding is indicated. Chapter 299
therefore provides a procedure reasonably adaptable to eviction practice.
3. The writing of a special procedure to cover one particular type of
case is probably inadvisable in view of the general trend to simplify
practice and to make it more uniform, particularly when a procedure
such as that in Chapter 299 is readily available and adaptable to cases
of this type.
For these reasons it was determined to work eviction procedure into
Chapter 299 as a complete alternative to Chapter 291 in cases involving
the removal from real property of persons not entitled to the possession
or occupancy thereof.
3
In addition, the committee studied an extension of eviction practice
to cover the situation where a tenant has vacated premises leaving per-
sonal property behind which the landlord is desirous of removing from
the premises, but decided not to incorporate a special procedure on this
subject in Chapter 299.
The basic plan, therefore, involved amendment of existing provisions
of Chapter 299 where needed -to improve eviction practice, and the
creation of additional sections necessary to a complete eviction proce-
dure within Chapter 299, together with those provisions felt necessary
to adequately spell out the procedures which were not previously codi-
fied in statutory form.
Exclusive Nature of the Remedy. The study committee considered
and rejected a proposal that the procedure set forth in Chapter 299
should be the exclusive remedy available to a plaintiff seeking to remove
both the person and the property of a tenant from real property for any
of the causes stated in the statute. This was meant to give the plaintiff
an option to proceed under Chapter 299 in county court or under old
Chapter 291, unlawful detainer, in justice court. However, while the
revision was pending before State Bar committees and the Legislature,
3 Wis. STAT. § 299.40(1) (1969), effective July 1, 1971.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the constitutional office of justice of the peace was abolished,4 the juris-
diction of municipal justices was limited to ordinance violations,5 and
Chapter 291 was repealed. Thus, by indirection, Chapter 299 in effect
provides an exclusive remedy for the removal of a tenant. But Chapter
299 eviction procedure is not the exclusive remedy in the case of pro-
ceedings to remove only the property of a tenant who has vacated,
because an action at law for damages for any rent due, coupled with an
attachment of the property under § 266.03.(1) (a) (where possible) is
preserved. Ejectment also remains.
A Bird's-Eye View of Chapter 299. To understand the procedure
proposed for eviction cases, it is necessary to appreciate the general
organization of and theory behind Chapter 299. The Chapter governs
procedure in county court in what is known as "small claims type ac-
tions."'7 Wis. Stats., § 299.01. These include money demands up to and
including $500.00, replevins up to $500.00, forfeiture actions, and, until
the revision, unlawful detainer8 Chapter 299 is not a complete procedure
in and of itself for the handling of these actions. Section 299.04(1)
provides that "except as otherwise provided in Chapter 299 the general
rules of practice and procedure in Title XXIV and Title XXV shall
apply to actions and proceedings under this chapter." Therefore, Chap-
ter 299 is a list of exceptions to the application of normal circuit court
procedure in actions within its purview. These exceptions, for the
most part, are those designed to make the disposition of small claim
type actions more summary in nature than would be the case if
circuit court rules applied.9 Therefore, the tack that was taken in the
revision of eviction procedure was to spell out those additional excep-
tions to circuit court practice made necessary by the type of action under
consideration.
STATUS OF THE PRIOR LAW
The prior law on unlawful detainer will not be treated in detail,
because the revision is so complete a departure that little need be said
except to point out that there were many serious conflicts in the prior
law which needed clarification.
Chapter 291 was a procedure unto itself insofar as proceedings in
justice court were concerned. However, when an unlawful detainer case
was brought in county court, difficulties were encountered in the attempt
made in the 1961 court reorganization to make Chapter 299 procedure
applicable in small claims actions. The basic difficulty arose from the
4 1963 Jt. Res. 48, 1965 Jt. Res. 50, vote April, 1966, repealing Wis. CoNsT. art.
VII, sec. 15.
5 Wis. LAws 1969, ch. 87, sec. 36, creating 'Wis. STAT. § 254.045 (1969).
0 Wis. LAWS 1969, ch. 284, sec. 7.
7 Wis. STAT. § 299.01 (1969).8 Id.
9 For a more detailed discussion of the chapter, see Boden, Wisconsin Snall
Claims Practice Under Chap. 299, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 38 (1963).
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fact that § 299.01 (1) provided -that the procedure of Chapter 299 should
be used in county court in all "unlawful detainer actions under Chapter
291."1O At the same time, § 291.05 was amended to provide that if an
unlawful detainer complaint is filed in county court "the provisions of
Chapter 299 with respect to pleadings and practice shall apply."'11 This
did not present a difficulty where Chapter 299 contained an express
provision on pleading and practice inconsistent with Chapter 291. It
did present a problem where Chapter 299 was silent on the proper
procedure. At first blush one might think that the procedure of Chapter
291 would be applicable in such instances. However, § 299.04 provided,
as previously noted, that where Chapter 299 was silent the rules of
practice and procedure in Title XXV should apply to actions under
Chapter 299. Unfortunately, Chapter 291 was not within Title XXV of
the Statutes (so-called circuit court procedure), but was within Title
XXVII. The provisions in Title XXV are the regular "circuit court"
rule of pleading and practice and the special procedural rules applicable
in actions of ejectment which are governed by Chapter 275. Putting
ejectment rules into unlawful detainer actions under Chapter 299 will
produce all sorts of surprising results. For example, Chapter 299 being
silent on whether a claim for rent can be joined in an unlawful detainer
action made it entirely possible that such joinder was authorized under
the provisions of § 275.10. All of this is noted merely to emphasize
the need that existed for a revision.
'Secondly, in a commentary on the prior law, it should be noted that
the statutes left the mechanics of the execution of a writ of restitution
and the manner of storage and disposal of the tenant's property pretty
much to the imagination of each of the seventy-two sheriffs of the State,
governed only by a very few cases which have been decided on the sub-
ject. The form of writ of restitution in old § 291.17 (made specifically
applicable to 299 practice by § 299.04(2)) merely required the sheriff
to give restitution of the premises to the plaintff and dispose of the
defendant's property according to the law. The rest is left up to the
sheriff. The reporter found a rather efficient and workable system estab-
lished for the most part by custom and usage by the Sheriff of Milwau-
kee County which formed the basis of the new sections on execution
of the writ of restitution.
DIscussIoN OF THE NEW EVICTION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Certain fundamental changes in practice and procedure were adopted
by the 1969 Legislature in bringing eviction practice under Chapter
299 which run throughout all of the sections in the new statutes. The
changes are to be effective July 1, 1971. Before considering specific
sections it is thought advisable to comment on these general changes.
10 Wis. LAws 1961, ch. 519, creating ch. 299.
11 Id.
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Change of Name to "Eviction Action." The terminology "unlawful
detainer" has been scrapped in favor of the term "eviction action." This
is done to completely divorce this procedure from the old unlawful de-
tainer practice with its overtones of criminal involvement. It is also
considered that this term will more accurately describe the type of pro-
ceeding with which we are concerned.
The Inclusion of Rent Claims in Eviction Actions. The new proce-
dure authorizes the joinder of a claim for unpaid rent with the claim
for restitution in an eviction action, and new 299.01 (1) makes it clear
that the amount of the rent claim is immaterial insofar as the applica-
tion of Chapter 299 practice is concerned (i.e., no $500.00 limit). In
present day circumstances, and with trial before a competent court of
record and not before a justice of the peace, there does not seem to be
any reason why a rent claim cannot be included as a second cause of
action in an eviction case. New York has allowed such a joinder since
1924.12 Massachusetts has authorized the practice since 1960, and Illi-
nois also allows such a joinder.13
Of course, a judgment for rent may not be entered in the absence
of personal service on the defendant, and this is taken care of by §
299.16(1).
Acceleration of Handling in Eviction Cases. Many of the suggested
changes speed up the time within which acts are to be performed or
proceedings taken, to make those times even shorter than under existing
Chapter 299 practice. This is in line with the general feeling that evic-
tion proceedings should be as summary as possible because there is so
seldom an issue for trial. This procedure actually represents a compro-
mise between a preservation of the present system and a totally summary
procedure undertaken, for example, by affidavit and order to show
cause. The latter procedure was rejected by the study committee for
the reason, referred to above, that it was felt that eviciton practice
should be worked into the framework of Chapter 299 with a minimum
of change, and to guarantee maximum fairness to the tenant.
Abolition of Opportunities for Delay. To expedite eviction actions
as much as possible the revision rejects certain built-in opportunities
for delay found in Chapter 291. A minimum adjournment procedure
is recommended in the suggested revision of § 299.27 to replace entirely
the adjournment possibilities presented by § 291.08 under which certain
defendants could adjourn the action on the return for as long as ninety
days. Eliminated also is the opportunity presented to the defendant,
under § 291.15 to stay proceedings after judgment by posting bond,
paying rent, etc. Substituted are provisions in proposed § 299.44(3)
12 N.Y. Real Prop. Actions and Proc., § 741(5) (McKinney 1963).
13 MASS. STAT., ch. 239, s. 3 (Supp. 1970) ; ILL. STAT., ch. 57, s. 5 (Supp. 1971).
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which would authorize a stay of the writ of restitution under certain
circumstances, but only in the discretion of the court.
Appeal Procedure. The recommended changes preclude the possibili-
ity of trial de novo on appeal.
We turn now to a discussion of the specific changes in the statute
to incorporate eviction practice fully into Chapter 299. The reader at
this point is referred to Chapter 299 as published in the 1969 Wisconsin
Statutes, and what follows will constitute a running commentary on the
changes which are incorporated therein, to be effective July 1, 1971.
Amendments to Present Provisions in Chapter 299
§ 299.01 (1) Eviction Actions. This section removes reference to un-
lawful detainer from Chapter 291 and Chapter 299, describes the newly
created action for eviction defined in the special sections on eviction, and
makes clear that Chapter 299 practice applies to all eviction actions
regardless of the amount claimed as damages for rent due. It is felt
that 299 practice should control regardless of the money damages
sought, because this ancillary matter can be adequately determined under
299 procedure no matter how many dollars are involved.
Cross Ref.: 299.40, infra.
§ 299.04(2) Forms. The amendment eliminates reference to Chapter
291. The only forms involved are of the verdict (old § 291.16) and of
the writ of restitution (old § 291.17), both adequately covered by new
provisions in Section 299.44 or by Title XXV.
§ 299.05(3) Return Date. The amendment speeds up the return
date of eviction actions in an attempt to accomplish the objectives of
making procedure in these cases as summary as reasonable. This ac-
tually represents a middle ground as compared to a proposal advanced
in the study committee that in some eviction cases at least, restitution
be accomplished on affidavit and order to show cause.
The study committee felt that the same practical effect could be
accomplished by a speed-up of the return date as would be accomplished
by a resort to a different practice. While conceivably an order to show
cause might be returnable less than five days after its issuance, it is
highly probable that most county judges would give at least five days
notice to the defendant. This manner of speeding up the return day
accomplishes the result with a minimum of departure from the standard
practice of Chapter 299.
§ 299.06 Pleadings. This amendment merely conforms this section
to the requirement of a written complaint set forth in new § 299.41,
infra. The necessity for written complaint in eviction is discussed under
that section.
Cross. Ref.: § 299.41, infra.
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§ 299.11 Venue. This merely amends to conform to the new name
to be given actions to remove tenants.
§ 299.12 Service of Summons. This section eliminates the use of
mail service in eviction actions for several reasons. 1) It is believed
that the defendant about to be dispossessed should have more formal
notice of the action. 2) With return date and service time shortened in
§ 299.05(3) and with the necessity of a return of process unserved to
trigger the posting procedure of § 299.16, infra, it was felt that too
much time might elapse in the return of the unopened summons by the
post office to the clerk and his communication with the plaintiff's attor-
ney to permit the prompt posting the plaintiff desires. 3) There is more
certainty in the sheriff's return "not found" to authorize the posting
procedure. Sub. (5) above refers to the non-resident motorist statute
and is not relevant in eviction cases.
§ 299.16(3) Adjournment, Posting and Mailing in Eviction Actions.
Eviction actions are removed from the general publication rules of Chap-
ter 299. § 299.16(3) applies only to eviction actions and provides a
quicker and cheaper method of obtaining judgment where the defendant
is not served personally than can be had in ordinary cases of service by
publication under Chapter 299. It also speeds up the former procedure
in Chapter 291, where in old § 291.06 a fourteen to thirty day adjourn-
ment was required and the notice had to be published twice.
No constitutional question of notice sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment of due process under the 14th Amendment should be presented by
the new procedure, even though it. does not involve publication. In the
first place, where service other than personal is had, the judgment is
limited to restitution of the premises. 14 In M'illiken v. Mlleyer 5 the Su-
preme Court of the United States said:
Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent
on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for
such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him
actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
(McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90) implicit in due process are
satisfied.
Such decisions as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,1 6
make it quite clear that the fundamental consideration in passing upon
the sufficiency of notice is whether the notice is reasonably calculated
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and to afford them an opportunity to defend. Service by
mail and posting are actually superior in this respect to immediate notice
by publication.
14 See WIs. STAT. § 299.16(1) (1969).15311 U.S. 457 (1940).
16 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
17 121 Wis. 127, 281, 99 N.W. 909 (1904).
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§ 299.21(3). Trials; Jury Demand. The only change adopted with
reference to trial by jury in its application to eviction actions is a re-
striction on the time within which a jury demand may be made. Under
Chapter 299 practice, trials are to the court in the absence of a jury
demand. Under § 299.21 a jury must be demanded on the return day
or within 20 days of joinder of issue. To discourage jury trials in evic-
tion cases the amendment to § 299.21(3) (a) requires the making of a
jury demand at or before the time of the joinder of issue in all eviction
cases. Practically, this means that the defendant would have to demand
a jury on the return date or trial would be to the court.
Consideration was given to the abolition of jury trials in eviction
cases, but it appears that such is not constitutionally possible. Article 1,
§ 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in contro-
versy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases
in the manner prescribed by law.
It apppears that, however denominated, an action to remove a tenant
from real property is an action at law. In Harrigan v. Gilchrist,"7 our
court said, at page 281:
A statutory action may or may not be an action at law accord-
ing as the statutory incidents conform to one or the other from a
common law standpoint.... The only right of trial by jury guar-
anteed by the constitution is the right as enjoyed at the time the
constitution was adopted. There is no such right as regards a
statutory action unless such action is coupled with statutory inci-
dents indicating that it is strictly legal in character, or the remedy
of trial by jury is expressly given by the statute.
Thus it appears that whether a statutory action such as unlawful
detainer is or is not triable by a jury is to be determined, in the absence
of express statutory provision therefor, with reference to whether its
general characteristics are those of an action at law or of a suit in equity.
The statutory action of unlawful detainer has generally been held to
be an action at law. "While not a common law action, but rather a
remedy in derogation of the common law, it (unlawful detainer) is an
action at law relating to real property sounding in tort."'$ Our court
has pointed out that unlawful detainer actions are legal in nature.10 Of
course, there are authorities for the proposition that an unlawful detain-
er action is a purely statutory remedy.2 0 However, though statutory, it
appears to be the type of action "coupled with statutory incidents indi-
cating that it is strictly legal in character," which is the test laid down in
18 36A C.J.S., Forcible Entry and Detainer, sec. 3 at 962.
19 Toal v. Clapp, 64 Wis. 223, 24 N.W. 876 (1885) ; Feiges v. Racine Dry Goods
Co., 231 Wis. 270, 285 N.W. 805 (1939).
20 King v. Cutts, 24 Wis. 625 (1869); Vincent v. Starks, 45 Wis. 458 (1878);
Hartnip v. Fields, 247 Wis. 473, 19 N.W.2d 875 (1945).
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the Harrigan case. One of the incidents not mentioned in the cases is
the fact that the judgment is not self-executing, requiring a writ of
restitution to carry into effect the judgment of the court.
Whether or not an unlawful detainer action is an action at law
within the constitutional provision, it appears that a jury trial in a
statutory summary proceeding to remove a tenant is guaranteed by
Article 1, § 5 on the second ground mentioned above, namely, that the
right to trial by jury in such cases existed at the time of the adoption
of the constitution in 1848 and must "remain inviolate."
The action for unlawful detainer has existed in Wisconsin in almost
the same form since 1839.21 Section (3) of the "Act to Prevent Forcible
Entries and Detainers" provided for trial by jury in a statutory unlaw-
ful detainer procedure not unlike present Chapter 291. In fact, the
statute required the justice, at the same time that he issued the summons
to the defendant, to "issue a percept to the sheriff or any of the said
constables, commanding him to cause to come before him twelve discreet
men of lawful age. . . ." to serve as the jury. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has considered the meaning of the constitutional provision that
the right of jury trial shall remain inviolate. In Stockhausen v. Oehler, 2
the court said at page 282:
Our constitution provides that the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. And this court has held that that provision
means the right of jury trial as it existed in the territory of Wis-
consin at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Again, in LaBowe v. Balthazor,23 the court quoted with approval
from Norval v. Rice"- where the court held that the term "remain
inviolate" means that trial by jury shall be available in every case sub-
sequent to the constitution where it was available prior to its adoption
under territorial law and "according to the course of the common law,"
as guaranteed in Article 2 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
Because of the grave constitutional question presented, and because
the whole question is probably largely academic when we consider the
number of jury demands that will be made, the revision preserves trial
by jury subject to the restrictive demand procedure.
§ 299.25(10)(b) Costs. This amendment merely provides that in
eviction cases where a money judgment for damages is also sought,
costs will be awarded measured by the amount of the money judgment.
In all other eviction actions costs are set at $10.00.
§ 299.27 Adjournments. Under 299 practice, the defendant is en-
titled to one adjournment of right for at least seven days, with the pos-
siblity of other adjournments for cause shown. The eviction amend-
21 Wis. TERR. STAT. 1839, at 148.
22 185 Wis. 277, 201 N.W. 823 (1925).
23 180 Wis. 419, 193 N.W. 244 (1923).
242 Wis. 22 (1853).
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ment to § 299.27(1) precludes adjournment except for cause shown
unless with the consent of the plaintiff; this, again, to prevent delay.
By comparison with old Chapter 291 where, in § 291.08, adjournments
were in the discretion of the court, cause must now be shown to obtain
an adjournment. It is felt that in eviction cases, where there is seldom a
triable issue, the defendant should be required to obtain the plaintiff's
consent or show cause to secure an adjournment.
§ 299.30 Appeals. There is no substantial departure from current
appeal practice in this section, although it has been substantially rewrit-
ten for clarity. A separate section, new § 299.30(3), was written to
cover appeals in eviction actions not tried to a jury of twelve. It pre-
serves the 10-day limit on appeal now found both in Chapters 291 and
299. The procedure for staying a writ of restitution pending an appeal
found in (3) (b) was borrowed from § 291.11 and 291.13, with, how-
ever, modernization and broadening of language to include any writ of
execution issued on a combined possession-money judgment, as well as
the writ of restitution. The manner of stopping the execution of an
already issued writ, either of restitution or execution, is simplified by
requiring only the service on the sheriff of the notice of appeal and
undertaking approved by the court.
Old 299.30(3) is renumbered sub. (4), and reference to eviction
actions is removed therefrom. Procedure of sub. (4), of course, con-
trols eviction appeals except for the time limitation, and preserves the
rule of review on the record in eviction cases tried under Chapter 299,
excluding the possibility of trial de novo as is had in appeals from justice
court under § 291.14.
Newly Created Provisions of Chapter 299
§ 299.40 General Provisions on Eviction. Sub. (1) makes it clear
that an eviction action is a civil action to remove the person and prop-
erty of a person not entitled to the possession or occupancy of real
property.
Section 299.40(2) is the provision permitting joinder of rent claims
discussed above. Sub. (3) makes it clear that eviction procedure cannot
be invoked until the notice requirements of Chapter 704 have been com-
plied with, if they are applicable.
§ 299.41 Complaint in Eviction Actions. Oral pleading is allowed
generally under Chapter 299 unless prohibited locally by court rule.2-
Most county courts in populous areas have by court rule required writ-
ten pleadings. This new section requires a written and verified com-
plaint statewide in all eviction cases.
It was determined that a written statement of the cause of action
was necessary in eviction cases for several reasons. A written complaint
25 Wis. STAT. § 299.06 (1969).
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permits a far speedier determination on the return day than is possible
if the court must take oral pleadings in each case. The eviction remedy
can be extremely drastic, and it is felt that the plaintiff should be re-
quired to state under oath that grounds for eviction exist. The require-
ment of a writing describing the property tends to avoid error in the
issuance of writs of restitution.
A question arose as to whether an affidavit would be preferable to a
complaint. Actually, there is little more involved in the drawing of a
complaint than in the drafting of an affidavit. A complaint with a prayer
for relief tends to give a better notice to the defendant of the object of
the action. Further, the use of a complaint rather than an affidavit tends
to keep the practice under Chapter 299 as uniform as possible.
The section further prescribes the content of the complaint in terms
generally taken from § 291.05. However, any questions as to whether
the property must be described by legal description is eliminated by the
provisions, borrowed from the Uniform Commercial Code, that any
description of real estate "is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it
reasonably identifies what is described," with the addition that a descrip-
tion by street name and number is sufficient. It should be noted that
§ 299.44(4) provides that the writ of restitution describe the property in
the same manner as described in the complaint. The study committee
felt that a reasonable description less formal than a legal description
would be sufficient in both instances.
§ 299.42 Service and Filing in Eviction Actions. This section re-
quires that the complaint be served with the summons in cases where
personal service is had. Where service is had by posting and mailing,
the matter is covered by § 299.16(3).
No time limit for filing the summons and complaint is specified, and
therefore the general practice under Chapter 299 and Title XXV will
govern.
§ 299.43 Defendant's Pleading in Eviction Actions. There seems to
be no necessity for written pleadings by the defendant, and this section
permits oral pleading. The section is silent as to when the defendant
pleads in an eviction action and is deliberately so, because the time of
pleading may vary depending upon how service is accomplished. It was
felt that there would be no misunderstanding of the time of pleading be-
cause the matter'is adequately covered by § 299.20, which provides that
"on the return date of the summons or any adjourned date thereof the
defendant may answer, demur, or otherwise plead to the complaint."
This section authorizes the defendant to put at issue any of the alle-
gations of the plaintiff's complaint, including title, thus putting to rest
the old doctrine that in unlawful detainer actions the question of title
does not arise and cannot be put in issue by the pleadings.2 6 This re-
26 See Newton v. Leary, 64 Wis. 190,25 N.W. 39 (1885).
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striction arose from the old concept that the summary action of unlaw-
ful detainer should be available only to try the right to possession and
not the right to title.2 7 Whether this limitation was caused by, or the
effect of, the denial of jurisdiction to justices of the peace to try title,
the matter is at this moment immaterial. Of course, right to possession
is the ultimate issue in an eviction action, but where the resolution of
that issue necessitates the trial of title, there is no reason, when the ac-
tion is filed in a competent court of record, to limit the issues triable
upon some historical notion that the judge should be presumed incompe-
tent to determine certain matters which may be material to the result.
§ 299.44 Order for Judgment and Writ of Restitution. Section
299.44(1) relating to the order for judgment is self-explanatory. The
writ of restitution provisions require a more detailed explanation.
The basic practice is lifted from old Chapter 291. However, the
great difficulty with Chapter 291 is its vagueness in describing the
details of the procedure. This defect is sought to be cured by the pro-
visions of this and the next section. The recommended procedure is
based to a large extent upon the practice which has evolved over the
years in the office of the Sheriff of Milwaukee County. It is felt that the
procedure recommended is readily adaptable state-wide. Some of the
restrictions written into this and the next section are derived from
abuses observed over the years by veteran employees of the Milwaukee
Sheriff's Office and deputy sheriffs assigned to restitution cases.'
Section 299.44(2) provides that the court order the issuance of a
writ of restitution at the time of ordering the entry of judgment. Judg-
ment is entered under Chapter 299 by the ministerial act of the clerk
immediately following the order for judgment from the court. 29 The
writ of restitution may then normally issue on the same day as the
case is determined. This procedure rejects the concept that there should
be a delay in time between the entry of judgment and the authorization
of a writ. It reflects the policy determination of the study committee
that the stay proceedings in sub. (3) adequately take care of this matter
and that an automatic holding back of the writ for any period of time
would be inadvisable and an unnecessary restriction upon the plaintiff.
Sub. (2) also contains the important restriction that the writ may
be executed only if delivered to the sheriff within 30 days after entry
of judgment. This restriction results from an abuse noted by the sheriff's
department with respect to the issuance of writs of. restitution on dor-
mant unlawful detainer judgments. Heretofore the plaintiff might enter
judgment, and even collect rent thereafter, issuing a writ of restitution
27 Gates v. Winslow, 1 Wis. 650 (1853).
28 The author, as Research Reporter, is grateful to Mr. Al Lynch of the Milwau-
kee County Sheriff's Department who drew upon 44 years of experience in
restitution cases for many of the suggestions incorporated in these sections.
29 WIS. STAT. § 299.24 (1969).
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many months later when the defendant defaults on some rental obliga-
tion not the subject of the action.
Section 299.44(3) relates to stays of the writ of restitution. Some
review of the existing law is necessary, although it is doubtful whether
any provision in old Chapter 291 on this subject applied, after the effec-
tive date of Chapter 299 in 1962, to an unlawful detainer action under
Chapter 299. Section 291.08 authorizes, in effect, a stay before judgment
of up to 90 days by posting an undertaking and thereby accomplishing
adjournment of the action. This practice is abolished in the revision,
and the stricter adjournment rules of Section 299.27 are adopted. Old
§ 291.15 authorizes a stay of proceedings after judgment if the defen-
dant pays all of the rent due or posts a bond. This section permits the
entire proceeding to be frustrated and is, in practice, simply a method
by which a slow-paying tenant can remain in premises. Sub. (3) of
§ 299.44 is the replacement of this section.
There are two possible alternatives in approaching this matter. One
might be to prohibit stays of the writ of restitution so that its issuance
upon entry of judgment could not .be prevented; such a rule would be
coupled with the requirement that the eviction action could not be com-
menced for a period of time subsequent to the accrual of action, for
example, 30 days, after the default in the payment of rent on account of
which the three-day notice is served. This would give the tenant an
opportunity to find another place to live and accomplish his moving. It
would eliminate any discretion in the court to weigh the equities after
judgment, and to decide in each particular case whether a stay was
warranted and for what period of time. The study committee found
some support among attorneys for a procedure of this type, but it
appears that, while this procedure would make for uniformity and
certainty, giving the tenant an "equity of redemption" in a certain sense,
the practical effect of such a rule would be to provide license for slow-
paying and defaulting tenants. The tenant would know in every case that
he had 10, or 20 or 30 days grace before the landlord could commence
an action against him, and the three-day notice would become in effect
a 13, or 23, or 33 day notice.
The other alternative is expressed in Sub. (3). The action may pro-
ceed quickly to judgment, and then the court has the power to entertain
a motion to stay the writ of restitution to alleviate hardship in particular
cases. The condition attached to the stay, namely payment of rent due
and to become due, is essentially the same as that expressed in § 291.15.
The subsection also provides for a procedure in the event that the
conditions of the stay are breached.
Sub. (4) provides a form for the writ of restitution which is sub-
stantially the form of the present writ found in § 291.17, with moderni-
zation of language and adaptation to county court practice.
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The author originally felt that it might be advisable to provide, in
addition, for a combined writ of restitution and of execution for use in
actions where a combined possession-rent judgment was recovered.
The utility of such a writ would principally be in permitting the orderly
return of an unsatisfied execution for the purpose of invoking other credi-
tors remedies to collect the money judgment. However, the sheriff's
office in Milwaukee thought that such a form would be inadvisable
because of the confusion that it would cause to deputy sheriffs. The
author did not, therefore, recommend such a procedure to the study
committee. In any event, the plaintiff with a possession-rent judgment
is entitled to a regular writ of execution under Chapter 272 which could
be executed along with the writ of restitution.
§ 299.45 Execution of Writ of Restitution. Sub. (1) makes it clear
that the sheriff has no discretion to withhold execution of the writ when
his fee is paid. However, it authorizes him to require a deposit to
cover expenses of removal, codifying a long-standing practice of the
Milwaukee County Sheriff. Also codified is the Milwaukee practice of
requiring a deposit to prepay the services of the deputies in accomplish-
ing the removal under § 59.28(24). No attempt is made in the statute
to specify the amount of the deposit because circumstances vary so
widely, even within a given county. Section 59.28(25) presently pro-
vides a method for settling disputes between the sheriff and the plain-
tiff by submitting the question to the judge. Presumably these are
settled summarily, and no attempt is made in this section to amplify the
provisions of § 59.28(25).
Sub. (2) attempts to describe how the sheriff should go about exe-
cuting the writ of restitution. Chapter 291 is presently silent in this
point, and the case law is meager. The court held in Andrea v. Thatch-
er 30 that an officer to whom a writ of restitution was issued, who within
an hour of the entry of judgment ejected the defendant and his family
and their property into the street, negligently or willfully damaging the
property of the defendant and without giving the defendant any time to
remove his family, was liable to the defendant for punitive damages.
In Gaertner v. Bues31 the court held that the sheriff must use ordinary
care in the execution of a writ of restitution. This standard has been
adopted in § 299.45(2). The sheriff is required to use ordinary care in
the removal of persons and property from the premises and in the
handling and storage of property removed, but he is authorized to use
such reasonable force as may be necessary in accomplishing the removal.
Section 299.45(3) attempts to detail the manner of removal and the
disposition of removed goods. Great difficulty was encountered in the
3024 Wis. 471 (1869).
31109 Wis. 165, 85 N.W. 388 (1901).
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drafting of this section because of the degree of flexibility which sheriffs
insist is necessary in order to efficiently handle restitution cases.
The sheriff is not normally equipped with the vehicles or manpower
necessary to accomplish the removal, and so he must be authorized to
hire a mover or trucker to accomplish the job. Sub. (3) (a) gives him
this authority. The discretion of the sheriff as to whom the mover or
trucker should be cannot be restricted, for example, to licensed contract
carriers. The study committee was advised that some of the moving
jobs undertaken by sheriffs in the state involve moving goods which are
so contaminated, dirty, and undesirable that great difficulty is encoun-
tered in finding someone who will move them. It is, therefore, necessary
that the sheriff be authorized to find whomever he can to move the
goods. The only restriction imposed upon him in this statute is that he
exercise ordinary care in making the selection.
Many of the comments set forth above in discussing (3) (a) would
apply to (3) (b), and constitute the reason for the very general language.
The only requirement placed upon the sheriff is that he exercise ordi-
nary care in causing the defendant's property to be taken to "some place
of safekeeping within the county." He cannot be restricted to such
places as licensed warehouses because much of what is removed is not
acceptable by them. Therefore, he simply has to scout around until he
can find a place to store the goods. The balance of Sub. (3) (b) is large-
ly self-explanatory. Risk of loss and responsibility for storage charges
passes to the defendant after delivery of the goods to the place of safe-
keeping, substantially codifying Gaertner v. Bues.32 The sheriff's obliga-
tion to notify the defendant of the whereabouts of his property is
discussed below.
Sub. (3) (c) codifies a practice of the Milwaukee County Sheriff
which the department considers essential to an efficient administration
of eviction laws. About 600 writs of restitution are issued in Milwau-
kee County annually. In about 88 per cent of these cases the tenants
move voluntarily upon notification by the sheriff that a writ has been
issued. In the other 12 per cent of the cases the sheriff is forced to
physically remove the defendant and his property from the premises.
The usual experience of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's office is that
in many of these cases the property found on the premises upon execu-
tion of the writ has no value. Under these circumstances no warehouse
can be found which will accept the goods because the warehouse can
never expect to recoup its storage charges upon foreclosure of a ware-
houseman's lien. Further, the sheriff's "informal" places of storage,
other than junk yards, will not accept such property. The study com-
mittee was advised that some sheriffs will leave such property on the
public way in front of the premises involved, simply abandoning it.
32 1d.
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This seems to be less advisable a procedure than that followed by the
Milwaukee County Sheriff of removing such property to junk yards,
which is the procedure authorized by sub. (3) (c). The difficulty with
this subsection is that the sheriff has cast upon him the burden of
determining whether the property has any value. In theory such a pro-
cedure might be criticized, but in practice it is occurring every day in
the execution of writs of restitution, and this subsection merely recog-
nizes the existing practice. The sheriff, of course, is bound to exercise
ordinary care in making the determination. A provision considered
important by the Milwaukee sheriff's office is found in the last sentence
of the subsection, which excuses him, in the exercise of such care, from
searching apparently valueless property for hidden or secreted articles
of value. Attention is directed to the fact that under this draft the
sheriff would be authorized to remove to junk yards property without
monetary value, even though it might have sentimental value to the
defendant. The notice provision of the subsection is discussed below.
Consideration was given to a possibility that worthless goods re-
moved from premises to the public street be considered a public nuisance
abatable as such, but it appears that so many complications of procedure
would result from such an approach that this section would become
unworkable.
The study committee rejected a proposal to codify a practice of the
MilvaukeeMilwaukee County sheriff which his office stated was com-
monly resorted to in unlawful detainer cases. The defendant being
evicted finds a new place to live, and when the sheriff arrives to exe-
cute the writ he is faced with the requiest to move the property to the
new place of abode of the defendant. The sheriff's office felt that re-
moval under such circumstances to a warehouse or other place where
the defendant may redeem the property, then carting it to his new resi-
dence, often did work an unnecessary hardship and in fact could be
penal in character. Therefore, the Milwaukee County Sheriff honored
such requests provided that the moving expense does not exceed the
amount chargeable to the plaintiff for removal to the warehouse or
other place of safekeeping. If the cost of removal to the defendant's
new premises exceeded such cost, the excess was chargeable to the
defendant and had to be prepaid by him if the mover declined the ex-
tension of credit. This practice actually inures to the 'benefit of the
sheriff because it eliminates his exposure to a negligence claim in the
selection of a depository for the goods. In rejecting a specific section
on this procedure, the committee did not condemn or abolish the practice
because the sheriff, under § 299.45 (3) (b), can determine the new resi-
dence to be a place of safekeeping if it is within the county.
Sub. (3) (e) makes it clear that deputy sheriffs may perform the
functions of the sheriff under the section.
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Section 299.45(4) governs the manner in which the defendant is
notified of the whereabouts of his property, and the only practical type
of notice, by mail to last known address even if it is the premises from
which he was evicted, is adopted.
CONCLUSION
The revision of Wisconsin eviction procedure was intended to up-
date and modernize that procedure, to locate it entirely within Chapter
299 of the statutes, to resolve conflicts arising out of the court re-
organization law, and to write a procedure where previously it was
necessary to rely upon custom and usage. The new procedure protects
the rights of tenants and at the same time protects the interest of the
landlords in that opportunities to delay eviction are substantially re-
duced. For the first time in Wisconsin, the statute defines the rights
and duties of tenants with regard to property removed from the prem--
ises. Hopefully the statute will produce a workable and efficient pro-
cedure for handling of eviction cases after its effective date-July 1,
1971.
